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Accounting for ethical difficulties in social welfare work: 





This paper is a preliminary exploration of social welfare practitioners’ accounts of 
‘ethically difficult situations’. It describes variations in the ethical vocabulary and 
form of these accounts. Analysis of practitioners’ own accounts (as opposed to 
‘textbook’ cases) draws attention to the ways they construct events, actions and 
qualities of character as ethically significant and highlights the qualitative 
distinctiveness of ethical dilemmas, where seemingly irresolvable choices leave a 
residue of moral loss, regret or guilt.   
 
Ethics and ethical difficulties in professional life  
 
The subject matter of ethics is generally regarded as being about how human beings 
treat each other and their environment – what actions are regarded as right or wrong 
and what traits of character are good or bad. The central questions in ethics are 
normative ones relating to: ‘what should I/we do?’ or ‘how should I/we live?’ 
Professional ethics covers topics relating to how professionals should act in relation to 
service users and others (such as how much autonomy they should have or give or 
how to distribute their resources of time and money) and what kinds of people 
professionals ought to be (honest, trustworthy, reliable, compassionate). There is 
obviously a difference between how moral philosophers talk when they are doing 
ethics and how we talk about ethics and ethical topics in everyday life. But the two 
are related, and in the field of professional ethics, the academic literature and practice 
guidance both draw on concepts and theories in moral philosophy and feed into their 
usage and development by moral philosophers – although this relationship is not 
unproblematic (see Banks, 2004, ch. 3).  
 
Textbooks on professional ethics in the health and welfare field regularly include 
sections on what we term ‘ethically difficult situations’. These often take the form of 
ethical problems or dilemmas presented as ‘cases’ written up by the textbook author 
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and analysed through the application of explicit ethical theories, principles or 
concepts. This is the case with one of our own textbooks and many others (see Banks, 
2001, pp. 160-185; Bond, 2000, pp. 223-236; Jones, 1994, pp. 35-119; Seedhouse & 
Lovett, 1992, pp. 33-128). Such cases may be real or imagined, or a mixture of both. 
What is described and how it is described are necessarily subject to authorial 
judgements of the intelligibility and adequacy of such representations for the 
pedagogic task at hand. In other words, even when such cases are offered as 
descriptions of factual instances, it is impossible to separate the point of view of the 
writer from the ‘substantive configuration of values, meanings, discourses, or social 
contexts assigned to a case ‘ (Lynch and Bogen, 1996, p. 270). Cases are analysed by 
the author, or presented for analysis by the reader, as vehicles for the identification, 
discussion and/or promulgation of general principles and rules derived from ethical 
theory. Authors often assume that such general principles can be applied by any 
informed agent, resulting in a justified and determinate judgement about what to do in 
this or in imaginably ‘similar’ situations. When these ethics cases are designed to be 
used in support of teaching they are often formulated as narratives which present the 
emergence of a ‘problem’ (a situation where a difficult decision has to be made) or a 
‘dilemma’ (a choice between two equally unwelcome alternatives) relating to 
professional interventions in matters of human welfare. Here the story endings may be 
unfinished so that the reader is invited to bring closure through a consideration of: 
‘what ought the practitioner do in this and other such cases?’ (Banks & Nyboe, 2003; 
Chambers, 1997).  
 
This paper takes a different starting point, namely, a consideration of accounts given 
by social welfare professionals when asked by researchers to talk about ethical 
dilemmas and problems they have directly met in the course of their work. 
Unsurprisingly, such accounts do not exhibit the exactitude of textbook cases in their 
specification of the nature of moral judgements and evaluations (responses to the 
question: ‘what ought I to do?’; or ‘is this just, fair, good?’). However, they will not 
be treated here as colloquial – and imperfect - attempts at such exactitude, but instead 
examined for the ways in which they exhibit details of the conceptual vocabulary of 
practitioners as moral agents, their constructions of relevant organisational contexts of 
actions, their attributions and avowals of professional and moral identity or integrity, 
and the nature of their reflections on actions, reasons, motives and emotions. It is our 
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argument that attention to such mundane details are necessary elements of any 
adequate interrogation of the ethics of social welfare practice. Rather than invoking an 
ironic contrast between practitioners’ and philosophers’ accounts of the nature of 
moral matters, we prefer to approach practitioners’ accounts as exemplifications of 
what is ethically relevant, demonstrable and plausible to them as they seek to describe 
and offer judgements of actions and events that they have encountered in the course of 
their work lives.  
 
Their descriptions and evaluations rely on and exemplify a stock of knowledge about 
what kinds of events, actions, people, institutional arrangements and motivations 
routinely – and exceptionally – recur in the course of professional social welfare 
work. This knowledge is derived from a number of sources, including formal training, 
informal socialisation and the accumulation of lived experience in relevant 
organisational settings. It can be characterised best as ‘vernacular’ knowledge insofar 
as it is indigenous to its group of users. It is what Geertz (1973) calls ‘local 
knowledge’ and Garfinkel (2002) refers to as ‘autochthonous’.  This vernacular 
knowledge is part of the same setting in which participants are located, as well as 
being used by them to account for the setting. In this paper we try to treat this 
knowledge as an explicit topic for our descriptive inquiries into what is accountable as 
an ethical issue for social welfare practitioners. 
 
It is important to stress that the research described here was not an ethnographic study 
of how practitioners interact with one another in the course of their everyday practice 
and the data presented are not field notes or recordings of witnessed events or 
conversations. Rather, the article examines a series of retrospective accounts of 
ethically difficult situations solicited by one of the authors during the course of an 
empirical investigation. These situated accounts necessarily are versions constructed 
for a specific occasion and recipient (the interviewer asking for reports of ethical 
problems), and they are not presented or analysed here as unproblematic reflections of 
‘what really happened’. Like all such retrospections, their formulation is at least partly 
determined by the situation of their production – in this case a research interview 
rather than an office conversation or a disciplinary hearing (Banks, 2002; Buttny, 
1993; Heritage, 1983). Nevertheless, the construction of such accounts as 
intersubjectively intelligible instances of naturally occurring ethical difficulties 
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necessarily draws on and exemplifies the stock of conventionally available and 
collectively recognised logical and discursive resources that make up the lingua 
franca of social welfare work.  
 
The interviews and approach to analysis 
 
In the course of 32 individual interviews with practitioners working in the social 
welfare field (social, youth and community work), interviewees were asked to give 
examples of ethical dilemmas or problems experienced in their practice. The 
interviews were semi-structured and centred around respondents’ views on the ethical 
implications of the changing nature of professional practice. This aspect of the 
research has been written up in Banks (2004). At the end of the interviews 
respondents were also asked to describe any ethical problems or dilemmas arising in 
their work generally. It is these accounts that form the basis of this paper. 
 
The interviewees were relatively experienced practitioners in social work, youth and 
community work. They included team managers and senior practitioners in local 
authority social services departments working in a variety of fields; youth and 
community workers in local authorities, partnerships and voluntary sector 
organisations; and community development practitioners and managers working in 
voluntary sector, local authority and inter-agency regeneration settings. Interviewees 
were selected through making requests to organisations for staff willing to discuss 
issues, and through existing contacts.  
 
The accounts given by the interviewees varied in both their content and form. This 
was inevitable, as we asked a fairly open-ended question, along the lines of: ‘What 
ethical dilemmas or problems do you face in your work?’ We deliberately did not 
define ‘ethical dilemma or problem’ because this might cause people to try to ensure 
that their account fitted the prescribed category. We referred to ‘dilemmas or 
problems’ in order to broaden the possibilities of what people felt they could talk 
about. If respondents then sought further clarification of what we were looking for, 
the interviewer would widen the description even further, to help them feel they could 
connect it with their experience. For example, in an interview with a youth worker the 
interviewer elaborated as follows: ‘So thinking of ethical dilemmas, ethical problems 
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for you … I mean, it’s difficult to say what is an ethical issue, it doesn’t really matter, 
it’s something where you hesitate, or you feel it’s problematic’. 
 
The interviews were transcribed and then examined using the computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis package NVivo (Bazeley & Richards, 2000; Gibbs, 2002). 
Although this package is very amenable to the use of a grounded theory approach to 
data analysis (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), the kind of analysis offered here is a more 
generic form of preliminary qualitative analysis the aim of which is to uncover 
discursive themes and issues that recur within and across participants’ accounts in 
order to subject them to more detailed study. Preliminary reviews of the transcripts 
focused on the types of substantive issues that practitioners reported as ethically 
difficult, which included issues relating to how much choice service users should 
exercise, the rationing of time and resources and maintaining professional integrity, 
for example (see Banks and Williams, 2004 for a more detailed discussion). The 
analysis also served to draw attention to the variations in vocabulary and concepts 
used by the practitioners to recount their ethical difficulties. This included, but was 
not limited to, their explicit formulations of what any competent professional would 
recognise as ‘ethics talk’ – for example, when and how they made reference to rights, 
responsibilities or ‘moral’ qualities of character. It also became apparent that the form 
of the accounts was very varied, in particular the ways in which the tellers featured as 
moral agents.  
 
This led us to differentiate the accounts according to whether they seemed to be about 
ethical issues, problems or dilemmas (this is elaborated upon in the next section). It 
should be noted that our methodology for the accomplishment of this analysis claims 
no special foundational epistemological status. Our identification and description of 
common themes, our explication of commonsense reasoning and our clarification of 
assertions about organisational contexts all necessarily rely on ‘native intuition, 
vernacular categories and commonsense judgements...an immense and varied set of 
competences that "we" already have available but that are amenable to further 
instruction and explication’ (Lynch, 1993, p. 305). Others have attempted to develop 
more formal analytical methods which aim to reduce these competences to 
generalised structures of reasoning and interaction (see especially Sacks, 1992), and 
there is a small body of studies which have already applied these methods to aspects 
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(including ‘moral’ aspects) of social welfare practice (for examples see: Gunnarsson, 
Linell and Nordberg, 1997; Hall, Juhila, Parton and Pösö, 2003; Jokinen, Julila and 
Pösö, 1999; Saranji and Roberts, 1999; Taylor & White, 2000; White and Stancombe, 
2003). However the analysis in this paper differs from these in its commitment to a 
‘deliberately underbuilt methodology’ (Lynch, 1993, p. 310) to support our 
descriptions of the understandings of ethical and organisational issues embedded in 
transcribed accounts. Rather than attempt further to develop or apply a catalogue of 
structural elements and rules for their combination, our concern is to preserve the 
local relevances of participants’ accounts in and through a description of their 
concrete details. In this short paper we merely make a start on this process. 
 
Our own descriptions were inevitably informed by our knowledge of theories and 
concepts from the literature of moral philosophy and professional ethics. One of us 
(Banks, 2004) has previously written about theoretical approaches to ethics based on 
duty, utility, rights, the development of moral character, the importance of particular 
relationships, care and moral sensitivity, all of which have relevance in recognising 
and analysing ethical assertions. Our analytical stance does not necessitate the 
abandonment of such prior knowledge, but only its suspension so that it is not used to 
characterise what participants say as instances of one or another formal theoretical 
assertions about relevant professional themes.  
 
How practitioners describe ethically difficult situations 
 
In this section of the paper we will specifically consider some of the discursive 
resources used by practitioners to make ethically difficult situations accountable to the 
interviewer. These resources comprise a set of detailed vocabularies as well as a set of 
overall forms within which these detailed vocabularies are expressed. We begin by 
describing some matters of detail before going on to discuss the overall forms used by 
respondents to provide a structural narrative for their accounts.  
 
The use of ‘ethics talk’ 
In some accounts given by practitioners ethical content was explicitly articulated by 
direct reference to conventionally recognizable ethical principles or concepts such as 
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‘rights’, ‘fairness’ or ‘respect’, for example. Some practitioners very confidently 
engaged immediately in recognizable ‘ethics talk’ as soon as they were asked for an 
ethical dilemma or problem, and some did not. Some respondents also gave reasons or 
justifications for their actions couched in ethical terms. Accounts can be divided into 
those that are: 
• Articulated explicitly in ‘ethical’ language – for example, using terms generally 
associated with ‘ethics talk’, like: ‘fairness’, ‘rights’, ‘choice’, ‘confidentiality’ or 
‘honesty’. For instance, a regeneration manager framed his dilemma in terms of a 
choice between some residents’ wishes for a new community building and the 
long-term sustainability of the community and area as a whole. He justified his 
actions using language that referred to recognisable community development 
values, such as the good of the wider community and sustainability. 
 
• Articulated without the use of specialist ethical terminology, but drawing on the 
practical intelligibility of moral standards and accountability – for example, a 
social worker described a situation that involved her breaking a promise and not 
respecting a service user, but without actually using the terms ‘promise’ or 
‘respect’. 
 
Referring to emotions  
 
Although the traditional ‘impartial, detached’ model of ethics expounded by some 
moral philosophers gives primacy to logical and reasoned argument, increasingly this 
view of ethics is being challenged as too limited and unable to do justice to our ethical 
evaluations and decision-making in everyday life (see Banks 2004, ch. 3, for a more 
detailed discussion). Emotions, empathy, sensitivity and commitments to particular 
people also have a significant role to play (see Nussbaum, 2001; Oakley, 1992; 
Stocker with Hegeman,1996; Vetlesen, 1994). We were interested, therefore, to 
examine what reference was made to emotions in these practitioners’ accounts. 
 
In looking at the accounts we were given of ethically difficult situations, some make 
direct reference to the emotions of the interviewee, such as embarrassment, frustration 
or anger.  Quite often, however, mention is not made explicitly to the emotions 
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involved. In these cases the style of some of the accounts is distanced, cool and 
‘rational’, while others give hints at the fact that the practitioner was/is upset, 
indignant or feels regret. Often this comes over in the tone of voice and body 
language as much as the actual words used. The fact that emotions are not expressed 
in the account does not mean they were not present in the situation, just that this is 
how the practitioner concerned chose to tell the story on this occasion.   
 
Giving form to ethical difficulty 
 
Given we had asked for details of ethical dilemmas or problems experienced in 
practice, we expected the accounts given to feature the interviewees as moral agents 
facing choices. However, in some cases accounts were given of ethically difficult 
situations that did not explicitly feature elements of choice or decision-making on the 
part of the narrator. In other cases, participants described situations in which they had 
experienced ethical difficulties in deciding what to do, while only a small proportion 
articulated a dilemma in its narrowest sense - a choice between two equally 
unwelcome alternatives, that is not easily resolvable.  These three forms are 
characterized below. 
 
1.   Ethical issue - a story about situation/type of situation that has an ethical 
dimension, but which is not articulated as a decision-making situation for the 
person concerned.  For example, a mental health social worker talked about a case 
where she was sure the drugs administered to a patient had exacerbated their 
illness, but it was not framed in terms of a decision or choice for her.  
 
2.   Ethical problem - a story about a difficult situation, where a decision had to be 
made, but where there was no dilemma for the person making the decision – that 
is, it was clear which course of action to take. For example, a social work team 
manager described a situation where he made a decision to respect the choice of a 
man with ‘significant’ alcohol problems to remain at home, despite the 
‘significant’ risks to his safety and the demands of friends that he was unsafe.  
This practitioner felt this was clearly the only decision that could be made, even 
though it had undesirable consequences for others.  
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3.   Ethical dilemma - a story of a decision-making situation involving a difficult 
choice between two equally unwelcome alternatives and it is not clear which 
choice will be the right one. A situation or event itself is not a dilemma, but may 
be construed as a dilemma by certain people. For example, the manager of a six-
year neighbourhood regeneration programme gave an account of having to decide 
whether to support residents in their desire for a large new community centre, or 
to encourage the scaling down of the project, with long term sustainability in 
mind. The manager had agonised over this choice and felt it was a ‘no win’ 
situation.  
 
Some of the ‘ethical problem’ formulations may merge into ‘dilemma’ formats. The 
moral philosopher Philippa Foot (2002, p. 177) offers one characterization of an 
ethical dilemma as a situation where there is evidence for and evidence against what 
an agent ought to do – and seen in this way it ‘need not be such as to put anyone in his 
[sic] senses into any uncertainty as to what to do’. Certainly, once a dilemma has been 
satisfactorily resolved, then it can be reconstructed as an ‘ethical problem’. But the 
distinction between ‘problems’ and ‘dilemmas’ is useful in that it focuses attention 
not on the difficult situation itself, but on the agent’s view of it. In resolving a 
dilemma, a choice is made, usually after much thought and agonizing, and one 
alternative is judged to be less bad/unwelcome than the other. But because the choice 
made still involves violating some moral requirement or principle, moral agents may 
nevertheless feel remorse or regret at the decision made or action taken. Some moral 
philosophers identify this as the ‘remainder’ or ‘residue’ left by the dilemma (see 
Williams, 1973, pp. 172 ff; Foot, 2002, pp. 37-58; Hursthouse, 1999, p. 44). 
According to Williams (1973; 1981, p. 76) resolving a dilemma (for example, 
whether to lie to save a life) involves a moral loss or cost (for example, in deciding to 
lie) even though it may be morally justifiable.While there has been some debate about 
whether the resolution of a dilemma inevitably involves committing a ‘wrong action’ 
(see Foot, 2002, for arguments against Williams), there is nevertheless agreement 
about the concept of the ‘remainder’ left over after a dilemma is resolved, which may 
entail regret (although perhaps not ‘guilt’ on Foot’s view).   
 
Although we have talked about ‘resolution’ of dilemmas (meaning a decision is taken 
about what to do), some philosophers argue that there are ‘irresolvable’ or ‘tragic’ 
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dilemmas (Hursthouse, 1999). However, it is clear that what is meant by this is not 
that a decision is not taken, but that the moral loss or cost (remainder) is enormous. 
The decision of parents about whether to authorize the separation of conjoint twins 
might be one such example, where it seems that either both children suffer or die 
without an operation, or one dies immediately post-operation, while the other may 
perhaps survive. This is certainly tragic, and in one sense ‘irresolvable’. But we would 
prefer to characterize it as ‘resolvable with remainder’.  
 
Accounting for ethical difficulties: some conspicuous examples 
 
The following extracts from transcribed interviews provide examples of the three 
forms of accounts described in the previous section. Each is followed by a short 
commentary and the underlying differences between the three forms are considered 
alongside differences in content in the next section of the paper. Brackets ( ) in the 
text indicate a significant pause in the speech; dots … indicate an omission made by 
the authors. 
 
Accounting an ethical issue 
 
This account came from a qualified local authority social worker working in a 
children and families team. Until recently her team covered child welfare only, but 
recently the team responsibilities have changed so that her job also includes child 
protection. This has resulted in child protection work taking priority over care and 
more general preventative work with children and families. This reflects the growing 
concern in social work and society generally with the prediction and prevention of 
child abuse (see Parton, 1998; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam, 1997) and the increasing 
use of procedures and assessment proformas. The ‘register’ she refers to in this 
account is a register of children ‘at risk’ of abuse held by the social services 
department.  
 
Child on the register for a number of years, no social work involvement. 
Right? Sandra gets the case. Hadn’t seen a social worker for two years. Sandra 
had to go out and see them, very embarrassing. And it was ( ) he hadn’t had ( ) 
the stepfather hadn’t actually abused the girls within the family, or there was 
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one girl. He had when he was 18 been babysitting a 14-year old or a 13-year 
old, and I think he touched her up. Right? Before ( ) when he was a lot 
younger, and because he’d become a Schedule 1 offender, because of 
whatever he’d done, he was a Schedule 1 offender, he met up with this girl, 
who had a baby, child protection, conference, on the register, never saw a 
social worker again. Right? Two years later Sandra starts working for the 
department and has to go out and make an assessment. And it was 
embarrassing. And they actually ( ) I had to work with this family for six 
months, who didn’t want me, and who were basically saying, ‘we’ve never 
seen anybody for two years and now you turn up and you’re asking all these 
questions’. 
 
[further clarification sought by interviewer and more details given by 
interviewee – omitted from this extract] 
 
… He was a Schedule 1 offender, so we did have to look into it, which is fine, 
but I think the department shouldn’t expect us to you know, suddenly enter 
into somebody else’s life for their own procedures. 
 
… We’ve got to follow our procedures with no thought as to how the family 
might perceive the situation. 
 
Sandra’s account is marked by compression. She starts by giving just enough 
information (not in a sentence format) to sketch in the background details of what for 
her is a familiar social work scenario (an ‘old’ child protection case). It seems that she 
does not want to waste time going over familiar ground, but perhaps her rapid account 
of the background is also an expression of her frustration and impatience with the 
situation in which she was placed. At the point where she gives information about the 
particular family, some more precise details are given (ages of participants and so on) 
using a fuller sentence structure. The account then speeds up again, using single 
words or short phrases to describe the familiar typical social work process: ‘child 
protection, conference, on the register, never saw a social worker again’.  This format 
seems to indicate that these are routine, predictable stages that any family in a child 
protection case would go through.  
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 This way of telling the story seems to reflect Sandra’s feeling of being a cog in the 
social services wheel, just as much as the family is. She uses her name ‘Sandra’ to 
refer to herself on three occasions before finally using ‘I’ when she says ‘I had to go 
out and see’ the family (she had no choice).  The use of the third person seems to 
emphasise her feeling of powerlessness, being subject to the command of a higher 
authority, which seems to mirror the family’s resentment at her involvement. She did 
not want to be there any more than they wanted her.   
 
The account does not present the teller as an active moral agent able to make a choice. 
However, the way she tells the story is as if she feels she should have had a choice. 
She should have been allowed to be a moral agent and be able to treat this family 
according to her own judgement, not the department’s procedures. She does not use 
many explicitly ethical terms, but when, after telling the story, she offers her 
reflective comments on the situation, this is when it is clearly characterized as an 
ethical issue. The essence of the situation for her seems to be summed up in her 
comment that ‘the department shouldn’t expect us ..’. Here the ‘should’ is a moral 
‘should’. This is a situation that should not happen. So she is telling the story not as a 
dilemma for her as a moral agent, but as a story about what the institution she works 
for does to her moral agency. On two occasions she uses the phrase ‘very 
embarrassing’.  This tells us a lot about why the situation was significant for her – 
embarrassment may comprise an uncomfortable emotion of being exposed or shown 
up in the eyes of others. Three points strike us particularly about this account: 1) the 
moral agency of the teller as someone able to make a choice does not feature in the 
account; 2) the story is given an explicit ‘ethical’ twist at the end, in the teller’s 
reflective evaluation on what should not have happened; 3) emotion (in this case 
embarrassment) features almost from the beginning and could be interpreted also as 
marking it as an account with ethical significance.  
 
Accounting an ethical problem 
 
The next account was given by the manager of an assessment and information team in 
a local authority social services department. He had qualified as a social worker 16 
years ago and previously worked as a child protection social worker and in training 
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for several years. The assessment and information team is responsible for taking all 
new referrals to the department and screening them against eligibility criteria (adult 
services) and assessment matrices (children’s services). The eligibility criteria had 
been relatively recently developed in this authority at the time of the interview, 
reflecting a growing preoccupation in social services generally with prioritizing and 
targeting resources at those most ‘in need’ or ‘at risk’, according to standardized 
criteria and matrices (see Harris, 2003; Lymbery, 2000; Parton, Thorpe & Wattam, 
1997).  
 
Is it because you get a bit older and wiser and think ‘oh, I’ve dealt with that’, 
you know? We had a ( ) how old would he be? Mid 50s, this chap, maybe a bit 
older, lived alone, lived at the top stairs of a flat, had a significant alcohol 
problem, was at significant risk, was hospitalised because of complications 
arising from alcohol. He just didn’t want to go into any kind of detox regime, 
he just wanted to go home, didn’t want any support, thank you very much, 
wasn’t prepared to consider moving, although people did a lot of work on his 
behalf to get him a safer environment in which to live. He went home, refused 
to see anybody, you know, and the particular social worker involved with that 
one is very, very anxious, as was his personal kind of network of friends. And 
you know, insisted that we do something, and you know, well, we can’t. He 
doesn’t want anything. He is rational. He’s able to articulate where he wants to 
be. ‘We are as equally as concerned as you are about the risks’, you know. 
‘But it’s alright for you’, you know. And he eventually did die. Fortunately not 
falling down the stairs, but ( ) so I suppose it’s the ( ) one of the things that we 
do is to carry the risks and responsibilities that other people would rather 
didn’t exist I suppose really. And ( ) but also balance that with people’s own 
sense of efficacy and choice. I think, as a manager of a team where we’re 
faced with that sometimes, where we know that people won’t cope particularly 
well and may indeed put themselves at significant risk of harm, you know, 
where we would recommend the services go in, but they choose not to, that ( ) 
I feel able to manage that ……… 
  
The team manager starts his story by explicitly reflecting on his long experience, 
which makes it easier to handle difficult situations. He quickly describes the situation 
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in ‘social work language’, categorizing the service user as having a ‘significant 
alcohol problem’ and being ‘at significant risk’.  He does not give details to justify 
these ascriptions, because what matters in the story is that in his professional 
judgement, and in the view of others, a significant risk was perceived.  Furthermore, 
having presented himself as someone with experience and wisdom, he probably 
assumes the interviewer accepts his account of the situation, as when he then says 
simply that ‘we can’t’ do anything, with the ‘we’ referring to the team as part of the 
social services department. He then describes the service user’s preferences and 
choices – an important consideration in social work ethics – as well as his own (team 
manager’s) judgement that the man is ‘rational’ and able to articulate where he wants 
to be. These are acceptable reasons within the social work sphere to justify not 
interfering with someone’s freely made choice, so he does not feel the need to explain 
why being ‘rational’ is an important consideration. Again, he would also assume the 
interviewer was party to this ‘social work talk’ and reasoning.  
 
He then talks first in the voice of the team/social services department to the concerned 
friends: ‘we are as equally concerned’ and then replies in the voice of the friends: 
‘But it’s alright for you’. This emphasizes the reality of the situation and the debates 
that must have taken place.  It gives a brief flavour of there being a dispute between 
two parties, before continuing with the very truncated factual account to inform the 
interviewer of the ending: that the man ‘eventually did die’, although luckily not from 
an accident (with the assumption that the interviewer knows the story might be 
different if the outcome had been more tragic). There is no trace of a ‘remainder’ in 
the form of regret or guilt in this account. No doubts are expressed and the manager 
presents the case as involving no choice for him as a representative of the social 
services department (there is no statutory or moral duty to intervene when someone is 
a competent and rational adult). But he does imply (without giving the details) that 
others were anxious and wanted things done. Perhaps had it not been for his wisdom 
and experience, the ‘very, very anxious’ social worker might have spent a lot of time 
trying to persuade the man to accept more support.     
 
He moves on quickly to offer his own reflective comments on the situation, 
categorizing it as a legitimate example of an ethically problematic situation by 
locating it within a general category of ‘risks and responsibilities’ carried by social 
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services departments/social workers. He is using recognizably ‘ethical’ language here, 
proceeding to talk of balancing these ‘risks’ and ‘responsibilities’ with people’s own 
‘efficacy’ and ‘choice’.  The use of the term ‘balancing’ again legitimates the account 
as an ethical problem story featuring the practitioner as someone who has to make 
difficult moral decisions.  This extract ends with the manager commenting that he 
‘feels able to manage’ the carrying of the risks – reinforcing his self-ascription at the 
beginning as someone of experience and wisdom.  Particularly noteworthy in this 
account is: 1) the clear account of moral agency (making a decision not to intervene), 
although with no dilemma or difficult choice expressed; 2) use of concepts with 
professional and ethical import (‘risk’, ‘rational’) in the main body of the account; 3) 
the explicit self-ascription by the social worker of certain qualities (age and wisdom); 
4) making a reflective ethical evaluation towards the end of the story, locating it in the 
context of the kinds of risks and responsibilities social workers carry in society. 
 
Accounting an ethical dilemma 
 
This final extract comes from a conversation with the Director of a medium-sized 
voluntary organisation with a community development brief. She had worked for this 
particular organisation for one and a half years and had ten years’ professional 
experience in the voluntary sector. She was talking about people volunteering in their 
local communities. Her account can be placed in the context of the recent imperatives 
coming from central government, particularly through programmes for 
neighbourhood regeneration and renewal, which require the participation of 
community representatives on the various committees, boards and partnerships that 
are developing and implementing local policies (see Banks and Shenton, 2001; 
Taylor, 2002). 
 
When you do get communities involved, what do you do when people who are 
downright obnoxious with the most outrageous attitudes and racist and sexist  
(  )  become very powerful within the community? How do you control that? 
Because there are despots out there who are leading community groups. They 
alienate the rest of the decent community, but they’re the ones who are 
negotiating with the district council. And it’s horrific! Absolutely horrific! 
And it does worry me. Because I know government is looking increasingly to 
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devolve decision making now to a lower and lower level and do they not 
realise who sometimes they’re going to be devolving it down to?  
 
… You’re in the ridiculous situation, you’re in a big meeting in the district 
council, and this guy who is awful, says ( ) makes an accusation, you ask him 
to substantiate it, you challenge him and say ‘I am sure that didn’t happen’ 
then it  ( ) ‘well, you weren’t at the meeting!’ and they’re really aggressive. 
They also attack the district council, and neither of us really could say ‘you are 
wrong, you are out of order, that’s not acceptable’.  
 
… Yes. There’s a lot of them. Yes, I mean, I had to come back and speak to 
my worker and said ‘I am sure you didn’t do this, I just need to check’. I then 
asked her to speak to the guy at the district council, and he said, ‘yes, I did 
know [about the accusation] and I didn’t think for a minute that he [the 
community representative] was speaking the truth.’  But it was a whole room 
full of people and some people may well have believed what he was saying, 
and it doesn’t do the organisation any good. It doesn’t do your staff morale 
any good. And there’s two people, two senior managers, who don’t have any 
mechanism to control an individual that’s very disruptive.  
 
… It’s just happened in an informal way that one of  ( )  actually it’s the [name 
of the county council community services department], we’ve been asked 
‘how do you find him?’ and we were honest and said ‘he’s aggressive, he’s 
very challenging, he puts people down, and he’s not terribly constructive’ and 
they were saying ‘yes, we’ve heard that’, so we’re kind of  ( ) so in an 
informal way they’re addressing that perhaps he’s not working as effectively 
as he should be, so you do have an informal network, and then I should think 
that if it becomes serious enough, I will be approached to make a formal 
complaint. How do you do that with a community member? You have no 
informal network, and you have no formal means of controlling them. And 
they’re dangerous!   
 
… I think partly why people don’t do it [challenge them] is because the 
backlash would be so huge, the amount of time it would take dealing with it, 
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mopping up the mess, you do a quick calculation in your head and you just 
think it’s not worth it, but they should be challenged. But they can make life 
so difficult ( ) I don’t know. It is a big dilemma, and again, I don’t know how 
to address that one, but it needs to be sorted.  
 
This practitioner is articulating a current dilemma for her, one that she does not know 
how to address – that is, it seems irresolvable.  She mixes discussion of a specific 
example with the general issue of what to do in cases like this. Her language seems 
like that of what Dingwall (1977) calls ‘an atrocity story’. She repeats the term 
‘horrific’ twice in the first paragraph and characterises these kinds of people as not 
only ‘disruptive’ but also ‘aggressive’ and ‘dangerous’.  She does not tell us precisely 
what the specific community representative to whom she is referring has said in 
public about her worker/her organisation, but it is clear she feels the accusation to be 
unjustified. She says in the first paragraph that this kind of situation ‘does worry me’, 
but this is clearly an understatement. In characterising the attitudes of such people as 
‘outrageous’ and the situation as ‘ridiculous’ she is conveying her own feelings of 
outrage and powerlessness (she has no means of controlling such people). 
 
Unlike the team manager in the previous case, this practitioner does not offer any 
reflection on the dilemma in ‘textbook’ ethical terms. She is focusing on telling her 
story, rather than doing any work for the interviewer to show how it fits into the 
‘ethical dilemma/problem’ category. But the dilemma is obvious and has the feel of 
‘whatever you do will be wrong’ about it. As she says in the last paragraph: ‘they 
should be challenged, but they can make life so difficult’. The ‘should’ here is the 
moral ‘should’ or ‘ought’. If we expand the dilemma it would be along the lines of: do 
you allow community representatives to make wild accusations in an aggressive, 
obnoxious and despotic manner, which is both unfair and damaging to those accused, 
or do you challenge them and risk a huge ‘backlash’ which would be very time 
consuming and difficult to deal with? The Director did not explicitly articulate the 
nature of the backlash, perhaps because she assumed that she and the interviewer 
shared the same understanding of the power of the simplistic rhetoric of community 
participation – namely, that community participation is a good. But it is implicit that 
this backlash could be equally as damaging to the reputation of her agency as the 
accusations being made. The Director chose the first course of action (allowing the 
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community representative to get away with it) in the immediate context of the specific 
accusation made in a public forum, in that although she questioned the accusation, she 
did not challenge his right to make such unsubstantiated and damaging comments in 
an aggressive manner. This ‘solution’ leaves her with a residuum not of regret, blame 
or guilt, as is often the case with dilemmas, but a sense of injustice and outrage. But 
the dilemma is on-going for her, as she is following up the matter in different arenas 
(with the district and county councils) and pondering on how to tackle similar 
situations in the future. Particular features of this account are: 1) it explicitly features 
the teller as a moral agent, facing a dilemma – a choice about what to do and not 
knowing what to do; 2) it uses ascriptions of moral character (‘racist’, ‘sexist’, 
‘decent’, ‘aggressive’, ‘honest’) which, perhaps, serve to mark it as a story with 
ethical import (as opposed talk of rights, responsibilities and so on); 3) as with the 
other accounts, this teller offers a reflective moral evaluation at the end, including 
identifying the situation as involving a dilemma, as if to confirm to the interviewer 
that she has given what was requested. 
 
Concluding comments  
 
This paper has explored a number of accounts given by social welfare practitioners 
when asked to describe ethical dilemmas and problems in their work. We have been 
interested in how such accounts are constructed by practitioners and how they can be 
interpreted by us as intelligibly ‘ethical’ in character.  
 
Our analysis and discussion of this material has obviously drawn on a set of 
theoretical and conceptual resources that has enabled us to identify what we regard as 
the ethically significant components of the accounts. In particular we have used 
familiar concepts and distinctions found in the field of moral philosophy (relating, for 
example, to rights, responsibilities, character and emotions). However, we were not 
looking to see how far the accounts given by practitioners of ethical difficulties fitted 
with the kinds of hypothetical or edited accounts (‘textbook cases’) commonly used in 
moral philosophy and professional ethics. Instead we wanted to discover what could 
be learned from the direct examination of these practitioners’ accounts about their 
versions of matters relating to right and wrong action, good and bad motives, valid 
reasons and compelling emotions. 
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 That their stories are selective, situated, complex and messy – with political, ethical, 
technical and practical elements intertwined – comes as no surprise. For that is what 
professional life is like. Professional practices and the surrounding conventions of 
those practices provide an essential ‘embedding network for concepts, standards and 
criteria’ (Jayyusi, 1991, p. 233). That the accounts are usually not neatly constructed 
in the format recognisable as an ‘ethics case’ (with a clear ‘plot’, an embedded ethical 
dilemma or choice and a set of reasons for action justifiable with reference to general 
ethical principles) is also not surprising, since these people are social welfare 
practitioners, not moral philosophers. Their accounts instantiate the dominant 
professional and moral assumptions necessary to make them intelligible as concrete 
instances of specific ethical difficulties – for example, in the second case, the 
assumption that the role of the social worker is to carry (and balance) risks and 
responsibilities.  
 
It is important to recognise that it is in the course of giving such accounts of actions 
and events as constituting ethical problems or dilemmas, that subjects reflexively 
construct their own identities as competent ethical, professional practitioners - as the 
kinds of people who possess certain kinds of character traits and behave in certain 
kinds of ways (see Taylor and White, 2000; Williams, 2000a & b). For example, 
Sandra’s account of her ethical issue provides the listener with resources for 
construing her as a social worker of ethical sensitivity, who experiences the emotion 
of embarrassment when making unjustified interventions. In the second case, the team 
manager presents himself as a person of experience and wisdom, able to carry the 
risks and responsibilities that are part of what ‘we [social workers] do’, whilst the 
Director in the last case describes herself/her organisation as ‘honest’.  This suggests 
that character traits (traditionally described as ‘virtues’ in the literature of moral 
philosophy), notions of professional roles and emotional responsiveness are important 
features of the accounts given by professional practitioners about ethically difficult 
situations in practice. As Walker (2003, p. 77) comments, moral problems are ‘nodal 
points in progressive histories of mutual adjustment and understanding, not “cases” to 
be closed by a final verdict of a highest court’.  
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These observations, that such instances of professional discourse serve to constitute 
the identity of practitioners at the same time that they represent and evaluate the 
actions of others, are especially important for understanding the significance of our 
arguments in this paper. Above all else we have been concerned to find a way to 
begin an interrogation of the seemingly self evident understandings of chronic ethical 
difficulties encountered in the course of the routine and exceptional accomplishment 
of social work practice. It is our argument that the nature of these difficulties (and 
their resolutions) are not best understood by validating or invalidating the descriptive 
and evaluative resources relied on by participants by comparing them with the formal 
vocabulary and grammar of moral philosophy. Instead we want to understand the way 
in which these uses arise ‘from the meetings and interactions of everyday life’ 
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 471). An essential feature of our approach is the necessity to 
remain sensitive to the contingencies of the organisational contexts in which these 
issues arise and within which their solutions have to be accommodated. The skilled 
explication, negotiation and resolution of these matters is the routine accomplishment 
of competent social welfare practitioners. It is hoped that the preliminary observations 
reported here based on practitioners’ accounts will be followed by further work based 
on more direct observations of the identification and management of ethical 
difficulties by social welfare professionals so that the nature of these 
accomplishments may better be understood. 
 
But are our interests relevant to practitioners themselves? In other words, can our 
approach make any positive contribution to the education, supervision, or the direct 
practice of social workers? We believe it can, insofar as it directly encourages and 
facilitates the kind of self- and organisational- scrutiny that we might refer to as 
‘practising ethical reflexivity’. This is a development of Taylor and White’s (2000, p. 
35) concept of ‘epistemic reflexivity’, and entails subjecting our own knowledge and 
value claims to critical analysis.  As they have pointed out, such scrutiny, whether 
carried out by students, supervisors or front-line practitioners, involves more than a 
simple reflection on what has been done (or not done), how, why, and with what 
effect. Instead it encourages practitioners to turn the ethical, professional and 
organisational resources that they implicitly use for competent practice into topics for 
explicit examination.  
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Students can be encouraged to write about or speak to each other about their own 
stories of ethical difficulties and then subject these accounts to critical scrutiny along 
the lines developed here. For example, a close examination of Sandra’s account with 
her supervisor or team will raise issues of how she constructs her moral and 
professional identity as sensitive and caring by drawing on certain types of 
professional ideals and values gained during her training. Through discussion and 
debate it may be suggested that this is at odds with other available identities of social 
workers, for example, as rigorous investigators. A more critical understanding of the 
ambiguities and complexities in such constructions of their professional role may help 
practitioners to implement and maintain a commitment to challenge some of the 




We are grateful to the practitioners who gave us their accounts and to the Leverhulme 
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